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LAND RENTS
The first step toward assessing productivity, a step interesting in its own right, is to survey the trend of nominal land rents. Table 1 presents rent averages from the sample for each decade from 1450 to 1789.3 Most authors limit themselves to simple averages, but because rent depended on land quality and location, I have also adjusted the averages for variations in quality as properties jump in and out of the sample.
Columns 2 and 4 display the results of the adjustment, which uses a regression of ln(rent) on property characteristics and other variables affecting rent.4
The net adjustment is relatively minor and does not affect the overall trend in land rent. Other methods of correcting for quality differences 3 For a detailed account of how I treated in-kind payments, pots-de-vin, contre-lettres, rent understatement, charges, and a host of related problems, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 1. Compare with Jacquart, "La rente fonciere"; and Beaur, Le march foncier, pp. 231-46.
4 The relevant property characteristics included soil quality; presence of natural meadow and vineyard, as meadow was scarce and vineyards entailed capital investment; surface area, as large properties typically rented for less; and distance from Paris, which measured the costs of transportation to the major market in the region. Ideally, one would want to have in the regressions a measure of the cost of shipping crops to Paris by the cheapest means available-overland for properties close to Paris, and by river for more distant properties, where the economies of river transport overtook the added costs of shipping crops to a river port and then loading them onto boats. For our properties, however, the shipping costs, as is shown in Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 2, were nearly perfectly correlated with simple distance. The quality-adjustment regression also included dummy variables for the devastating war years of the League and its immediate aftermath; for the late eighteenth century, when rents seemed to rise; for repeat tenants, because historians believe they depressed the rent; and a time trend, to capture the effects of inflation and changing prices. Only the property-attribute terms, not the time-attribute terms, were used in adjusting the rents for quality. See Table 1 Notes: Column I is the average rent for the leases in the sample; column 2 is the average of quality-adjusted rent for the leases in the sample; column 3 is the area-weighted average of quality-adjusted rent for all leases in force; column 4 is the average of quality-adjusted In(rent) for the leases in the sample; and column 5 is the agricultural price-cost index (mean equals 1). The quality adjustments rely on regression 1 in Table 2 and begin by correcting In(rent) lease by lease.
Column 4 is the decennial average of the following: z = In(rent) -alxl -a2X2 -a3,x3 -a4x4 -a5X5, where a1 through a5 are the coefficients of percentage meadow, percentage vineyard, good soil,
In(distance to Paris), and In(area) in Table 2 , regression 1; and xl through X5 are the corresponding variables measured as deviations from their means. The variable z is quality-adjusted In(rent);
because the quality adjustment is linear, we would get the same answer if we first averaged In(rent) over each decade and then applied the quality adjustment. Column 2 is the decennial average of ez for each lease; because exponentiation is not linear, column 2 will not be precisely the same as what we would get by exponentiating the values in column 4. Column 3 averages the area-weighted rent for all the leases in force; it involves the same quality adjustment, except that x, through X5 are now measured as area-weighted averages. Column 5 is !, the ratio of agricultural prices to the costs of C the factors of production other than land, where each price and each cost is weighted by its share in total revenue. Shares are from the Bernonville farm. See Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendices 1, 3, 6, and 9 for details.
Sources: Sample of leases; other sources are listed in Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 14. (Table 1 , column 3). The difference with the second method is that it weights leases by area and counts not only leases signed in a given year but all those from previous years that remain binding.
The only discrepancy between the two methods appears when crises strike or when rents are growing. During crises, averaging over all the leases in force exaggerates somewhat the rent that was actually paid; during rent inflation, it lags behind the true value of the land. The difference may of course seem small, but it can disturb the calculation of productivity, which requires an up-to-date figure for rent-ideally, what land would fetch if leased to the highest bidder. Given the slight problems with averaging over all the leases in force, I therefore eschew it in favor of the average over the leases in the sample-that is, only the leases signed in any period. In other words, columns 2 and 4 in Table 1 are preferred to column 3.5
This rental series, it turns out, matches the evidence unearthed by other historians. Plotting the numbers in Table 1, 
USING LEASES AND PRICES TO MEASURE PRODUCTIVITY
Today we can easily measure the productivity of agricultural labor by dividing the quantities of goods produced by the number of workers.
Performing a similar computation for the Old Regime, however, is a hopeless undertaking; even though it has been attempted, the results seem dubious. The problem is determining the size of the agricultural labor force, a calculation that, even when based on nineteenth-century census records, is fraught with difficulty. How does one know what 5 For a discussion, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 3.
6 Veyrassat-Herren and Le Roy Ladurie, "La rente fonciere." Because these scholars deflated their rent series, I multiplied their figures by the moving average wheat price that they used for deflation. It is equally difficult to trace the evolution of the productivity of land.
To be sure, we can derive grain yields from a variety of documents, and the yields measure the productivity of land used in grain farming. The problem is that the French evidence is always scanty, making comparisons of yields over time a treacherous venture. Grain output per hectare varied drastically from year to year and from one end of a farm to another, casting doubt on any comparison between, say, a sixteenthcentury yield taken from a lone probate description of a particular field and a nineteenth-century yield calculated from a census average for the surrounding arrondissement. Worse, even seemingly reliable averages can be deceiving. If wheat supplants crops of lesser value (such as rye)
7 Postel-Vinay, "A la recherche de la revolution dconomique"; and Bompard, Magnac, and What McCloskey and Allen relied on was the fact that total factor productivity can be calculated with prices and rents in place of the actual physical measurements of the products and factors of production.
The definition of TFP here is a standard one. It gauges the effectiveness of farm production and is defined-roughly speaking-as the average product of all the inputs to farming. Its rate of change equals the speed at which farm production is growing less the rate at which use of the factors of production is increasing, with each product weighted by its share in total revenue and each factor by its share in total cost. In mathematical terms, the rate of growth of TFP is m n n m EUi ~i -Ei ijj= j, E u*ipUi (1) i= 1 j= 1 1= 1 i-1
Here the yi's are the outputs produced; the pi's and us's are the corresponding output prices and output shares in total revenue; the xj's, the factors of production used; the wj's and vj's, the corresponding factor prices and factor shares in total cost; and dots refer to growth rates. The expression on the left is simply the definition of TFP measured in terms of physical units of inputs and outputs; under conditions specified below, it will equal the expression on the right, which is measured in terms of prices.
If we also assume, as Allen does, that the product and factor shares remain constant over time (an assumption that turns out to be very reasonable for early modern agriculture), then we can integrate equation 1 to get a formula for TFP:
Here r is per hectare nominal rent; t is per hectare taxes; s is the factor share of land; C is a geometric index of the costs of the other factors of production weighted by their factor shares; and P is a geometric index of the price of agricultural products weighted by their shares in total revenue. We have made the reasonable assumption that the burden of taxation falls on land, so that the cost of land equals rent plus taxes, or (r + t). In nonmathematical terms, TFP is high if a property manages to support high rent and taxes despite high costs for the other factors of production and low product prices.1"
To calculate TFP, it thus suffices to know product and factor shares, economists and historians alike: that the agricultural cost and product shares can be described with some precision for a period of three centuries, that agricultural markets existed, and that the land rental market was competitive. These assumptions obviously deserve detailed scrutiny.
The first is that we know the agricultural technology well enough to calculate the factor and product shares that enter into the formula for TFP. One might suppose that the shares could be recovered from clever regressions with rents, prices, and wages, but such a tactic is doomed to 12 Imagine, for example, that a growing population drove wages down relative to agricultural prices and pushed rents up, while TFP remained constant. The cost index C would decline relative to the price index P, while rent and hence (r + t) rose, but the change in rent would be just enough to compensate for the change in prices and wages, leaving TFP = (r + t)SCIP constant. Note that measuring the prices here either in money of account, as I have done, or in precious metal would yield the same answer for TFP and for its rate of change. Converting prices to silver, for instance, would simply multiply the numerator and the denominator in equation 2 by the same number, because the product and factor shares sum to 1. TFP would thus be unchanged. Nor do product shares in total revenue seem to have changed.
Farmers did plant new crops such as artificial meadows, but the effect on the overall proportion of outputs was small. Farmers near Paris had specialized in grain production as early as the late Middle Ages; they continued to do so into the nineteenth century. What animal products they produced-such as wool from the sheep that fertilized the arablederived from grain production, and relative prices never shifted in favor of acquiring additional livestock. Indeed, because much specialization in early modern Europe was driven by the effect of transportation costs on relative prices-farmers hundreds of miles from cities might raise easy-to-transport livestock, while those nearby tilled fields of wheat-it is no wonder that our farms, all near Paris, never abandoned arable farming. 17
While the assumption of constant product and factor shares appears reasonable, it would be prudent to check the sensitivity of the results to variations in the share values. To do so, I relied on an alternative set of product and factor shares from a farm north of Paris, whose accounts have been analyzed by Gilles Postel-Vinay and J. M. Moriceau.
Although the Bernonville and the alternative shares resemble one another, there are a few differences, for the Postel-Vinay and Moriceau farm had specialized to a certain extent in the production of oats.
Indeed, one might argue that the differences were as great as might be expected between any two farms on the outskirts of Paris. Nonetheless, as we shall see below, the alternative shares yield similar estimates for
TFP. 18
The formula for TFP also assumes the existence of rudimentary markets in which the factors of production can be purchased and farm products sold. We must be able to measure prices in those markets to calculate the indexes C and P in equation 2 for TFP. Not all of a farmer's dealings need have passed through the product and factor marketsmerely a portion. It would not matter, for example, that a farmer employed some family members, provided he also hired servants. Nor would it matter that he consumed some of his crops, provided he also sold a portion. As long as he had some involvement in the markets,
16
The reason demographic data are useful here is that under constant factor shares the ratio of rent to wages will be proportional to the ratio of labor to land, which we can approximate by the rural population. For details concerning this and the following paragraph, see Hoffman, "Land
Rents," appendix 6.
17 One should not forget the importance of vineyards in certain parts of the Paris Basin; they remained important up to the nineteenth century. though, it would be fair to say that the costs and the prices he faced equaled those dictated by the market, once we allowed for the costs of transportation and of market preparation.
Here, obviously, we may raise some historians' hackles, for Old Regime farmers are often considered self-sufficient peasants who were thoroughly isolated from markets. The evidence, though, suggests that self-sufficiency itself was largely a myth. This was certainly the case in the Paris Basin. Nearly all the peasants in the region either cultivated wine for sale, worked on the side as farm laborers, or rented land in a tight land market. By no stretch of the imagination were they self- Of course, we should not jump to the conclusion that a national labor market existed. Labor markets were regional, though the one around Paris was undoubtedly large enough to embrace the localities from which our leases were drawn. Nor should we overlook evidence that the labor market was segmented, with farmers in certain places and at certain times able to hire cheap labor at a cost that bore only a slight relationship to the wages paid in Paris. There is some evidence for such segmentation, but it is as yet neither overwhelming nor convincing.
Differences in remuneration were not large, and they may simply have reflected the heterogeneity of labor, the complexities of in-kind pay, and variations in the cost of living. And it is difficult to argue for complete segmentation in the face of the enormous mobility of labor in the Paris
Basin during the Old Regime. Parisian workers, we know, helped take in the harvest. Domestics quit the farm for the city, as did paupers fleeing rural poverty. And whole families moved in and out of the small towns surrounding Paris, presumably in search of work. Given such mobility, it seems unlikely that the regional labor market was partitioned into isolated and mutually exclusive compartments.22
As it does for agricultural labor, my method also requires the existence of markets for agricultural capital-in particular, livestock.
Fortunately, long-distance markets for horses, cattle, and sheep reach far back into the past, and though prices series for livestock are skimpy and we must be careful of differences between breeds, it is possible to assemble the necessary series of cost trends-or at least gross averages for 25-year periods, which are all that is necessary for our cost index C in the formula for TFP.23
For the price index P in the formula for TFP, we need prices of agriculture outputs, and here it is grain that poses the most daunting problems. averaging over the outgoing lease) seems concordant with contemporary practice. We shall therefore calculate P and C using the Bernonville shares and Paris prices averaged over the outgoing lease. Table 1 displays the resulting decennial averages of the price-cost ratio P/C, which are all we need to calculate TFP. Of course, we can check the sensitivity of our results to this process of averaging by using prices from a radically different set of years in the indexes P and C. We shall do so, using prices averaged over the life of the new lease-or in other words, over the current year and eight years into the future. This alternative set of prices makes strong demands of our tenant farmers (namely, that they be able to see eight years into the future), but as we shall see, it does not change the index of TFP greatly.25
As for transportation costs, though they drove a wedge between grain prices in distant markets, the long-run average price trends-all that is necessary for our price index P-tended to move together, as long as the markets were not too far apart. Away from Paris, for instance, grain prices in local markets were lower and more volatile than within Paris in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries-yet price trends in markets as far as 100 kilometers away tended to follow the trend of the Paris price, particularly if we examine averages, which smooth out local crises. Such parallel movement should hardly be surprising in view of the considerable evidence that merchants and large-scale farmers carried out what amounted to intermarket arbitrage in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. With individuals buying and selling once price gaps widened, it is no wonder that grain prices, though different in absolute terms, exhibited similar trends.26
The last assumption we need is that untaxed profits from farming eventually went to landlords-in other words, that the land rental market was competitive, with no barriers to tenant entry. In the short run, it is clear, such was not always the case, for it might take a landlord time to renew a lease or even to realize that more could be squeezed out of a property. What concerns us, though, is the long run. Unlike the markets for labor, livestock, and agricultural products, which swarmed payments or self-production, one might suppose that the farm gate price of grain bore no relationship to the market price, but such was not the case near Paris. On this point, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 8.
25 See Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 9. Prices were too fragmentary to calculate P/C before 1520. Decennial averages of the component prices of P and C and alternative versions of the ratio PIC are available on request from the author. One bit of evidence that might nevertheless be construed as a sign of tenant market power is the lower per hectare rent sometimes found on big farms and large plots of land, reflecting the possibility that tenants able to take on a large farm were powerful enough to force down the rent.28 To judge from regressions of ln(rent) on variables affecting rent levels (see Table 2 , regression 1), even Notre Dame's larger properties rented for somewhat less per hectare.
But it would be wrong to conclude that Notre Dame's tenants pushed down the rent, for there is a very different explanation for the lower per hectare rent that large plots sometimes fetched, an explanation not dependent in the slightest on the market power of tenants. We should recall that renting out land, even for a fixed rent, involved risks for the early modern landlord. His property might be ruined by neglect, or, worse yet, the tenant might fall behind in paying the rent or not pay it at all. Such risks were far from insignificant, even for small plots of land.29 Because of them, a landlord might have to seek a judgment against a tenant or seize his assets. But only the large-scale tenants had assets such as livestock or equipment that a landlord could attach. The landlord could therefore allow big fermiers to fall into arrears, knowing full well that their livestock and equipment served as collateral for their debts. With small-scale tenants, however, the landlord had no such assurances; his only recourse was to demand a risk premium in the form of higher rent.
Evidence of a different sort also casts doubt on the market power of tenants in the Paris Basin. Large-scale tenants in the region commonly switched farms during their careers. Their mobility would fit a world in which landlords easily introduced new tenants from other villages.
Tenants also had large families, and though one could perhaps imagine collusion between two or three tenant patriarchs in order to depress Note: Growth rates equal the rate of change of logarithms calculated from lease to lease. The price-cost ratio is as in Table 1 , and the TFP growth rates are not adjusted for taxes. As is shown in Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 13, the lack of a tax adjustment will not affect the regression coefficients because the growth rate of taxes relative to rents figures among the explanatory variables. Years before 1520 are omitted; t-statistics are in parentheses.
Sources: See Table 2 source notes.
sample of leases shows that the rent never behaved in such a fashion. If we regress the rate at which ln(rent) increased from lease to lease on the rate of change in the agricultural price-cost ratio PIC and other variables affecting the rent, we find that retaining the same tenant depressed the rent by a microscopic and statistically insignificant amount ( This assumption is open to criticism, but the evidence for competition in the rental market obviously runs in its favor; so too does an eighteenthcentury analysis of farm earnings, which suggests that entrepreneurial profits were minuscule and far too small on the average to affect our TFP calculations.31
Although the use of prices and leases to calculate TFP may now seem reasonable, a reader might still like some reassurance that an index of TFP based on something so intangible as prices would really yield reliable results. In one instance where, thanks to an unusual set of family records, we can compare physical quantities produced and factors employed for a real eighteenth-century farm in the Paris Basin, the method of calculating TFP described here gives extraordinarily accurate results. Neither the assumption of constant product and factor shares nor the use of prices in place of physical quantities seems to be misleading.32 31 For how rent was set, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 9; for entrepreneurial profits, see my appendices 5 and 10. One might still worry that entrepreneurial profits could vary enough in the short run to disturb the trend of TFP. The most likely case would be one in which inflation in agricultural prices drove up profits before rents could be pushed upward. In such cases, TFP as calculated from equation 2 would be negatively correlated with the inflation rate, because with inflation we would underestimate the cost of the entrepreneurial input by setting it equal to the wage rate, and the higher agricultural prices would then push down our estimate of TFP.
Fortunately, we can test for such a phenomenon by adding the agricultural inflation rate to regressions with ln(TFP). We would expect to find a negative and significant coefficient for the inflation rate, but in fact that never occurs, even if we vary the way we measure inflation.
Moreover, the regression coefficient of the inflation rate implies only a small correction to TFP. It is worth noting here that equation 2 does not assume that the land supply is fixed or that the tenant farmers were profit maximizers-though without profit maximization, our definition of TFP has no necessary connection with technical change. We do have to assume the existence of a large number of risk-neutral tenants, but risk neutrality is not an absurd assumption for the sort of wealthy fermiers who rented Notre Dame's farms. For them, even profit maximization is not unrealistic.
For a discussion and other assumptions, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 5.
32 The example, from data kindly furnished by Gilles Postel-Vinay, concerns the highly productive farm that provided our alternative shares. We can compare its productivity in the 1740s and 1780s using physical inputs and outputs via a Tornqvist productivity index. The index is equivalent to using a translog production function, but it allows us to compare productivity without doing regressions. With this technique we find that productivity on the farm rose 9.79 percent between the 1740s and the 1780s. If instead we use the method adopted throughout the rest of this article-with shares that came from the Bernonville farm-we get very nearly the same thing, 9.03 percent. Clearly, our price-dual results are close to the primal, or quantity-based, results.
Moreover, practically none of the difference between the two numbers was caused by the constant shares assumption. For details, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 11. 
LN(TFP) FOR ALTERNATIVE PRICES AND SHARES (ADJUSTED FOR TAXES AND LAND QUALITY) THE NOTRE DAME PROPERTIES Productivity trends
What then do the leases reveal? The place to begin is with the evolution of TFP. From equation 2, TFP equals (r + t)sC/P, where r is per hectare rent; t is per hectare taxes; s is the factor share of land; and C and P are the indexes of agricultural costs and prices. We do not know t precisely, but if we ignore taxes for the moment-an oversight soon to be corrected-then the logarithm of TFP will be very nearly equal to sln(r) -In(P/C), which we can average across properties for different periods. We can then chart, at least roughly, the changes in TFP, and we can hone the accuracy of the graph by adjusting In(r) for variations in land quality via the procedure used in Table 1 . 34 In 1650/74 the TFP index with alternative prices is inflated-perhaps artificially-because it employs prices eight years into the future; it thus incorporates the depressed prices of the 1670s, when P/C is very low (Table 1 , column 5). Its jump in 1775/89 may also be a fluke. As our prices series stops in 1789, we cannot really incorporate prices eight years forward; rather, we have to calculate P/C in the late 1780s with prices from only a few years in the late 1780s, making the alternative price estimates suspect.
35 As TFP equals (r + t)sCIP, omitting taxes t, as we have, would tend to understate both the level and the growth rate of TFP, if taxes were rising relative to rents. The precise taxes t for each piece of property will never be known precisely, but one reasonable assumption is that for the ith property the fraction of gross rent (that is, rent plus taxes) going to the landlord rather than to the fisc is g, where ln(g) equals b ln(ta/ra) + c;. Here b is a negative constant, ta is the average per capita tax assessment, ra is the average per hectare rent, and c; is a constant that varies from property to property. Under this assumption, which amounts to saying that taxes were apportioned with an eye toward average rent and population levels, we can estimate the magnitude of the error involved in omitting taxes from the formula for TFP. The way to do so, shown in Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 13, is to regress the growth rate of TFP measured without taxes on the growth rate of ta/ra, which we can derive from tax receipts, population statistics, and average rent levels. We then subtract the product of the growth rate of ta/ra and its regression coefficient from the measured growth rate of TFP in order to correct the measured growth rate of TFP for the omission of taxes.
To adjust the measured level of TFP, we subtract the same regression coefficient times In(talra). The following century witnessed a recovery and then slow growth. At least a part of the apparent gains in the century after 1650 was in fact a mirage, reflecting a decline in transportation costs rather than increased agricultural productivity. The cost of transport, we recall, drove a wedge between farm gate prices and Paris prices for bulky commodities such as grain and thus progressively reduced rents on land farther from the city. Because our calculation of TFP is based on Paris prices, and because the measure of TFP combines low local rents with high Paris grain prices, we undoubtedly underestimate the absolute level of TFP for farms distant from the city. The reason again is the simple fact that local rents adjust to transportation costs and local prices, not to the higher prices prevailing in Paris.
As long as local grain prices moved in parallel with Paris prices-the usual pattern-there would be no cause for worry. Although absolute levels of TFP might err slightly, trends in productivity and rates of productivity growth would be the same. But over the course of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, local prices in markets such as Pontoise and Soissons rose slightly to approach those prevailing in Paris, and the gap between the Paris price and the local prices closed.43
What was happening was that transportation costs were dropping.
The increase in local prices relative to the Paris price was more pronounced the farther markets were from Paris, just as we would expect if the cost of transportation were falling. Such declining costs were themselves a mark of increased productivity, but in transportation rather than in farming.44 Unfortunately, our measure of TFP would mistakenly confound the two. Rents would increase as local grain prices converged to meet the Paris price, but as we would be judging rents relative to a Paris price index P, it would seem as if TFP were rising, particularly on distant farms where the effect of declining transportation costs was most conspicuous. It was precisely on such farms that the productivity gains in the late seventeenth century seemed largest. It is true that the measure of TFP used here may lag a bit behind reality. It took time to renew a lease, time to determine that a tenant was thriving and that the rent could be ratcheted upward. A wise landlord might wait before demanding more from his tenant, lest the tenant go bankrupt and the landlord receive nothing. Notre Dame, for example, investigated several tenants in the late 1750s, discovered that they were profiting, and ruled out the prospect of bankruptcy. Only then did it raise the rent. If such a pattern were general, the increase in productivity could have begun earlier than the graphs suggest.47
Whether the upturn began slightly earlier or not, nothing suggests that the eighteenth-century jump in TFP was peculiar to the properties owned by Notre Dame. Nominal rent increases of 79 to 120 percent between the 1730s and 1780s were common in Ile-de-France, Picardy, and the Beauce. On the Notre Dame farms the increase was 105 percent (Table 1, translates into a 25 percent drop in TFP, and the t-statistic is too large for it to be a fluke (Table 2 , regression 2). Similarly, TFP really does jump after 1775-by 6.6 percent, if we judge from the coefficient of the variable for the years after 1775. As for the rest of the three centuries, the coefficient of the year, which averages TFP growth outside the periods from 1589 to 1597 and from 1775 to 1789, is certainly consistent with our story of rapid gains in the early sixteenth century, a sharp recovery after 1589 to 1597, a crisis in 1625 to 1650, and slow growth for the following century.50
As does the analysis of local prices in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the regressions also argue against interpreting the increase in our TFP index exclusively as a decline in transportation costs. If falling transportation costs alone were to explain all the growth of our index of TFP, then the rate of change of TFP would seem higher farther away from Paris. It would be on the distant properties that local prices would rise the most, and rents would follow in their wake. We would therefore expect to measure higher rates of TFP growth on distant properties and hence a positive coefficient for the logarithm of the distance to Paris in the regressions with the rate of change of TFP (Table 3, regression 2 ).
Yet such is not the case. The coefficient is insignificant and negative, and while transportation was growing more efficient, farming did the same.
49 For the regressions with alternative shares and prices, see Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendices 6 and 9. In Table 2 , the level of TFP includes a correction for taxes, but in Table 3 the TFP growth rate does not. The coefficients in Table 3 will not be affected by the failure to correct for taxes, because the growth rate of taxes relative to rents appears among the explanatory variables. See my appendix 13 for an explanation. The TFP growth rate regressions also include a dummy variable for ongoing repairs and for tenants who repeat from previous leases, which corrects for any market power that repeat tenants may have exercised. Finally, though one might argue for regressing nominal or real rents on prices and wages, the regressions swiftly bog down in multicollinearity, and in any event it is not uncommon to regress productivity indexes on explanatory variables. For an example, see Allen, "Efficiency."
50 One cause for worry is the large value of the condition number, a sign of multicollinearity.
Although multicollinearity may therefore cast some doubt on the results with ln(TFP), it does not afflict the regression with the TFP growth rate, which points to the same dip in 1589 to 1597 and to the same sharp increase after 1775 (Table 3, famille. That soil quality has no effect on rent or on TFP ( Notre Dame had so much land that it could occasionally effect a consolidation by leasing two of its own properties to the same tenant.
An examination of such consolidations shows some failures but also some striking successes, as in La-Grande-Paroisse in the early seventeenth century, where TFP gained 6 percent.55 Further evidence emerges from surviving rural tax rolls, which by the late eighteenth century routinely carried information about the total acreage a tenant farmed. Taxes were generally paid by tenants rather than absentee landlords, and the assessments in any given year turn out to be very nearly proportional to the total acreage the tenant worked. Assessments Again, the overall tax rate per hectare had shifted between 1740/41 and 1783/89, but the change in taxes for a given property still yields a relative measure of how much more land the later tenant farmed. In 55 AN LL 329-30; S 272; and S 273 (1636-1654) .
56 For the tax rolls, see Guerout, Roles de la taille. A search at the Archives Nationales turned up tax assessments for 44 tenants in the series Z IG, and those assessments bore out the close relationship between the amount of the assessment and the number of hectares the tenant farmed.
Tax assessments may have been misleading in earlier periods and in other regions, but here they seem a reliable guide to the acreage farmed. However, I was able to get leases and usable tax assessments for only seven of the properties in both 1740/41 and 1783/89. When more than one tax assessment was available for a property in 1740/41 or in 1783/89, I averaged the logarithm of the different assessments for each period. There is no tax correction in Figure 4 ; for an explanation, see
Hoffman, "Land Rents," appendix 13. 
